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PUTTING EQUALITY TO A VOTE: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS, AND THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT 
Billy Corriher* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently determined that an Arkansas Su-
preme Court decision “denied married same-sex couples access to the ‘con-
stellations of benefits . . . linked to marriage,’” quoting its 2015 marriage 
equality ruling.1 The High Court overruled the state supreme court and 
struck down an Arkansas law treating same-sex couples differently with 
respect to their children’s birth certificates.2 As the Court’s per curiam deci-
sion recognized, the ruling in Oberfegell v. Hodges said that states may not 
“exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and con-
ditions,” including “birth and death certificates.”3 The Arkansas Supreme 
Court’s handling of marriage equality and another civil rights issue that was 
controversial in Arkansas—school desegregation—exemplifies how elected 
judges can limit individual rights in the face of political pressure.4 An ap-
pointed Arkansas Supreme Court would be more likely to defend individual 
rights from violation by the government than an elected court. 
Studies have found evidence that judges respond to political pressure.5 
In fact, multiple studies have found that supreme courts elected in expen-
sive, politicized judicial elections exhibit these trends, including rulings 
 
* Senior Researcher, Institute for Southern Studies. J.D., Georgia State University College of 
Law; B.A., University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill. The author wishes to thank the William 
H. Bowen School of Law at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock for its support and for 
encouraging discussion of these issues. 
1. Pavan. v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017) (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584, 2601 (2015)). 
 2. Id. at 2078–79. 
 3. Id. at 2078 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601). 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 
J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 169–71 (2009) (a study by Prof. Joanna Shepherd of a data set of state 
supreme court decisions from 1995 to 1998 found evidence to support “the widespread belief 
that judges respond to political pressure in an effort to be reelected or reappointed.” She 
concluded that voters’ political leanings were strongly associated with judges’ voting records, 
but “the voting of judges who do not face pressure from retention politics—judges with per-
manent tenure and judges in their last term before mandatory retirement—does not reflect the 
political preferences of the same groups” of voters). 
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against LGBT rights, criminal defendants, and plaintiffs in tort cases.6 At the 
federal level, framers like Alexander Hamilton argued for an independent 
judiciary to counter political pressure.7 Some of the studies on elected judg-
es confirm Hamilton’s view on judicial selection by showing that judges 
who are not facing reelection or reappointment do not exhibit the same 
tendencies as those who want another term on the bench.8 Federal judges are 
on the bench for life or until their retirement because judges who never have 
to be reappointed or reelected can make decisions based solely on the law 
and the facts.9 
Federal judges, who are insulated from political pressure, led the way 
in the fights for marriage equality and racially-integrated schools in Arkan-
sas, even if their rulings were not popular in the state.10 The elected Arkan-
sas Supreme Court, in contrast, has generally stayed in lockstep with public 
opinion and the political branches on high profile civil rights issues, avoid-
ing rulings that would have been controversial among voters.11 The state 
supreme court acceded to the state’s attempts to limit or delay the imple-
mentation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion12 and Obergefell v. Hodges.13 
 
 6. See, e.g., Eric Lesh, Justice Out of Balance: How the Election of Judges and the 
Stunning Lack of Diversity on State Courts Threaten LGBT Rights, LAMBDA LEGAL (2016), 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/justiceoutofbalance_final_rev1_2.pdf; Joanna 
Shepherd & Michael S. Kang, Skewed Justice: Citizens United, Television Advertising and 
State Supreme Court Justices’ Decisions in Criminal Cases, SKEWED JUSTICE (2014), 
http://skewedjustice.org/; Billy Corriher, No Justice for the Injured: Big Business Is Funnel-
ing Campaign Cash to Judges who Allow Corporate Wrongdoers to Escape Accountability, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (2013), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/
05/NoJusticeforInjured.pdf. 
 7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 8. Some studies have found changes in judges’ voting behavior as their reelection 
nears. See Michael Kang and Joanna Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical 
Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 75 
(2011) (a study by Professors Joanna Shepherd and Michael Kang found correlations be-
tween contributions from business groups and rulings in favor of businesses, but “when 
elected judges are serving their last term before mandatory retirement, their favoring of busi-
ness litigants essentially disappears.”); See also Melissa Hall, Constituent Influence in State 
Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 49 J. OF POLITICS, 1117, 1117–24 
(1986) (concluding that judges facing reelection pressure are less likely to dissent in high 
profile cases if their views are inconsistent with their voters’ views). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. Univ. of Ark., The Arkansas Poll (2017), https://fulbright.uark.edu/departments/
political-science/partners/arkansas-poll.php; Julie Ray, Reflections on the “Trouble in Little 
Rock,” Part II¸ GALLUP NEWS (Mar. 4, 2003), http://news.gallup.com/poll/7900/reflections-
trouble-little-rock-part.aspx. 
 12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
 13. 135 S. Ct. 2584. See infra Part II. 
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As Arkansas struggled against the desegregation of its schools, Justice 
Jim Johnson fought to preserve white supremacy,14 and his colleagues on the 
state supreme court acquiesced to the political branches’ efforts to delay 
complying with Brown.15 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court intervened in 
Cooper v. Aaron to end Arkansas’ obstinacy,16 with the backing of President 
Dwight Eisenhower’s National Guard troops.17 
More recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s record on LGBT rights 
has been disappointing, to say the least. An Arkansas justice admitted that 
his court delayed ruling in a 2014 same-sex marriage case because of the 
political implications,18 and the court in 2016 ruled that a mother had no 
right to be listed on her child’s birth certificate, along with her wife.19 The 
Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the state could continue treating same-
sex couples differently,20 but the U.S. Supreme Court recently overturned 
this decision.21 As in Cooper half-a-century earlier, the High Court instruct-
ed state officials to implement its groundbreaking civil rights ruling.22 
In contrast, federal courts have enforced individual constitutional 
rights, even when a political majority in the state objects.23 The legal battles 
over civil rights in Arkansas shed light on the political pressure that can 
influence elected judges. Hamilton said that without an independent judici-
ary that can check political majorities, all of the Constitution’s “particular 
rights or privileges would amount to nothing.”24 When judges must be 
reelected to keep their jobs, constitutional values like justice and equality 
are left solely in the hands of a political majority. Elected judges, therefore, 
cannot serve the counter-majoritarian role that the system of separation of 
powers sometimes requires.25 
 
 14. Gene Lyons, Racist “Justice” Is Dead, but not Gone, SALON (Feb. 17, 2010), 
http://www.salon.com/2010/02/18/justice_4/. 
 15. Garrett v. Faubus, 230 Ark. 445, 446–48, 323 S.W.2d 877, 877–78 (1959). 
 16. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 17. Exec. Order No. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 24, 1957). 
 18. Ex-Justice: Arkansas Supreme Court Voted to Strike Gay Marriage Ban, Withheld 
Ruling, ARKANSAS NEWS (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.arkansasnews.com/news/arkansas/ex-
justice-state-supreme-court-voted-strike-ban-gay-marriage-held-ruling. 
 19. Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at *18, 505 S.W.3d 169, 181 (2016), judgment 
rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (the court upheld an Arkansas law that requires a husband to be 
automatically listed as a parent on a birth certificate, though there is no such presumption for 
wives of women who give birth). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. 2075. 
 22. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pavan, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (No. 16-992), available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/16-992-cert-petition.pdf. 
 23. See supra note 11. 
 24. Hamilton, supra note 7. 
 25. Joanna Shepherd & Michael S. Kang, Judging Judicial Elections, 114 Mich. L. REV. 
929, 939 (2016). 
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Part II of this essay discusses two examples of the Arkansas Supreme 
Court failing to protect constitutional rights in the face of political pressure, 
contrasting the state judiciary’s role with that of the federal courts in enforc-
ing constitutional rights to marriage equality and to integrated public 
schools.26 Part III then acknowledges that, in recent years, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court has broadly interpreted the right to jury trial in civil cases and 
other related provisions of the state constitution.27 However, healthcare pro-
viders and other special interests critical of these rulings are funding the 
campaigns of supreme court candidates that they prefer.28 Part III also dis-
cusses how these special interests are using “soft on crime” attack ads to 
elect their preferred judges, and how the rights of criminal defendants may 
be caught in the crossfire.29 The essay concludes in Part IV by arguing that 
Arkansas’s highest court should be chosen in a way that maximizes its inde-
pendence from political pressure.30 This would help to ensure that judges are 
not chosen based on their political acumen or ability to attract campaign 
contributors. The Arkansas Bar has proposed a system in which justices are 
appointed by an independent commission, based on qualifications, for a sin-
gle term.31 Arkansas should adopt this amendment. It would give justices the 
independence needed to protect individual rights and check the power of the 
political branches. 
II. BOWING UNDER POLITICAL PRESSURE 
A. The Judiciary’s Role in Desegregating Little Rock’s Schools 
History views Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus in a harsh light, due to 
his attempts to stop school desegregation in the late 1950s.32 Behind the 
scenes, Arkansas Supreme Court Justice Jim Johnson played a crucial role 
 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See infra Part III. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 370 Ark. 139, 
257 S.W.3d 879 (2007) (assessing the legislature’s compliance with rulings that it was not 
providing a constitutionally adequate education to some school districts); Bayer CropScience 
LP v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, 385 S.W.3d 822 (2011) (striking down a limit on punitive 
damages awards). 
 28. Billy Corriher, Koch Brothers and D.C. Conservatives Spending Big on Nonpartisan 
State Supreme Court Races, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (August 2014), https://cdn.american
progress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Stat eSupremeCourtsv2.pdf. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See infra Part IV. 
 31. See TASK FORCE ON MAINTAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON MAINTAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY 
13 (2016). 
 32. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Little Rock Nine, HIST., 
http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/central-high-school-integration (last visited Feb. 
15, 2017). 
2017] INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 595 
in pushing the governor towards his infamous, hardline stance.33 Before he 
joined the court in 1958, Justice Johnson drafted a state constitutional 
amendment that rejected the Brown decision and sought to preserve a racist 
education system.34 Justice Johnson also won a seat in the state legislature in 
1950, and soon after, he brought the White Citizens’ Council to Arkansas.35 
The future justice actually challenged the governor in 1956, criticizing Fau-
bus for not opposing integration strongly enough.36 Governor Faubus kept 
his seat, but Justice Johnson’s popularity as a gubernatorial candidate may 
have played a key role in pushing the governor to oppose racial integration. 
Justice Johnson even claimed that he fed the governor false information 
about a mob planning to converge on Little Rock’s Central High School as it 
was desegregating.37 Governor Faubus used the perceived threat of vio-
lence—by mobs or students—to justify closing schools in the 1958-59 
school year, under authority he had just been granted by the state legisla-
ture.38 
Justice Johnson was elected to the supreme court in 1958.39 During his 
tenure, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s approach to desegregation was simi-
lar to that of the governor, and it may have reflected the prevailing senti-
ment among white voters.40 In Garrett v. Faubus, the court upheld the law 
allowing the governor to close schools.41 The majority’s opinion commented 
on Brown: “We deeply deplore the fact that the Supreme Court of the United 
States did not follow the clear legal precedents announced in Plessy v. Fer-
guson.”42 The court said that Plessy “must have been reassuring to the peo-
ple for nearly fifty years.”43 The justices acknowledged that it must respect 
the Brown decision, but it upheld a law that it acknowledged was “intended 
to slow the implementation of integration . . . until a lawful way could be 
devised to escape it entirely.”44 
 
 33. Lyons, supra note 14. 
 34. KEN GORMLEY, THE DEATH OF AMERICAN VIRTUE: CLINTON V. STARR 100–01 
(2010). 
 35. John Kirk, The Election that Changed Arkansas Politics, ARK. TIMES (March 28, 
2012), https://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/the-election-that-changed-arkansas-politics/Conte
nt?oid=2140398. 
 36. Id.; JOE CONASON & GENE LYONS, THE HUNTING OF THE PRESIDENT: THE TEN-YEAR 
CAMPAIGN TO DESTROY BILL AND HILLARY CLINTON 68–69 (2000). 
 37. Lyons, supra note 14. 
 38. Garrett v. Faubus, 230 Ark. 445, 446–48, 323 S.W.2d 877, 877–78 (1959). 
 39. Editorial, What’s at Stake When Judges Become Politicians, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Apr. 26, 2006. 
 40. Garrett, 230 Ark. at 454, 323 S.W.2d at 881; Ray, supra note 11. 
 41. Garrett, 230 Ark. at 450, 323 S.W.2d at 879. 
 42. Id. at 450, 323 S.W.2d at 879. 
 43. Id. at 454, 323 S.W.2d at 881. 
 44. Id. at 453, 323 S.W.2d at 881. 
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The court in several passages mentions voters’ opposition to integra-
tion. A year after Justice Johnson’s election, the court said, “we take judicial 
notice of numerous elections where the people have expressed their feelings 
in no uncertain terms.”45 Integration was described by the Garrett court as 
“a social problem fraught with frightening consequences in the minds of 
many people.”46 The court said that the course of desegregation “can be bet-
ter charted by those closest to the people affected and therefore better ac-
quainted with local conditions.”47 The justices said that Arkansans would 
prefer this to “being forced into acceptance . . . by a few people who are far 
removed from the scene and who, they feel, are not sympathetic or under-
standing.”48 One concurring justice warned that integration would lead to 
“extracurricular activities involving social contacts,” including sports and 
school dances.49 
Justice Johnson joined in a colleague’s dissent that also criticized 
Brown but found that the school-closings law violated the state constitu-
tion.50 The dissent seemed to take pride in Arkansas’s defiance of Brown: 
“There began in the Southern States—of which Arkansas is proud to be a 
part—a determining and never-to-be-ended campaign to prevent racial inte-
gration in the public schools.”51 
The federal courts, however, strived to implement Brown and rejected 
the state’s attempt to delay desegregation.52 In the fall of 1957, two days 
after a state judge issued a temporary restraining order to stop the integra-
tion of Central High, a federal judge overruled this decision and enjoined the 
plaintiff seeking the order.53 The Eighth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals af-
firmed the federal judge’s ruling.54 
In its landmark Cooper v. Aaron decision, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
jected Arkansas’s effort to thwart desegregation and harshly criticized the 
state’s elected officials for attempting to avoid implementing Brown.55 “The 
constitutional rights of children . . . can neither be nullified openly and di-
rectly . . . nor nullified indirectly . . . through evasive schemes for segrega-
tion.”56 The Court acknowledged that violence had erupted, but it blamed 
the state’s elected officials for inflaming racial tensions. “The constitutional 
 
 45. Id. at 459, 323 S.W.2d at 884. 
 46. Id. at 458, 323 S.W.2d at 884. 
 47. Garrett, 230 Ark. at 456, 323 S.W.2d at 882. 
 48. Id. at 458, 323 S.W.2d at 884. 
 49. Id. at 470–71, 323 S.W.2d at 890–91 (Robinson, J., concurring). 
 50. Id. at 482–83, 323 S.W.2d at 896–97 (McFaddin, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 482, 323 S.W.2d at 897. 
 52. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 53. Thomason v. Cooper, 254 F.2d 808, 809–10 (8th Cir. 1958). 
 54. Id. at 811. 
 55. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4. 
 56. Id. at 17. 
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rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or yielded to the violence and 
disorder which have followed upon the actions of the Governor and Legisla-
ture.”57 The school board in Little Rock told the Court that all three branches 
of Arkansas’s government opposed desegregation.58 The Court responded: 
“No state . . . judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violat-
ing his undertaking to support it.”59 It is a bedrock of our federalist system 
that state government officials cannot defy federal court orders.60 
A comparison of the Cooper and Garrett decisions highlights the dif-
ferences in how the state and federal courts dealt with desegregation in Ar-
kansas. The state’s judiciary sanctioned the political branches’ attempt to 
delay integration and perhaps “escape it entirely.”61 Justice Johnson even 
claimed that he played a pivotal role in pushing the governor to defy the 
federal courts.62 But federal judges, who are largely insulated from political 
pressure, ordered Southern states to allow black and white children to attend 
school together.63 
After he left the state supreme court, Justice Johnson went on to man-
age the Arkansas campaign of segregationist presidential candidate George 
Wallace.64 When “Justice Jim” Johnson ran against Republican Governor 
Winthrop Rockefeller in 1966, he publicized rumors that Rockefeller was 
gay.65 
B. State Supreme Court Abdicates Its Role in Marriage Equality 
In 2014, an Arkansas state judge struck down the state constitution’s 
ban on same-sex marriage as violating the U.S. Constitution.66 Pulaski 
County Circuit Court Judge Chris Piazza compared the marriage amendment 
to the ban on interracial marriage struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the 1967 Loving v. Virginia case67: 
It has been over forty years since Mildred Loving was given the right to 
marry the person of her choice. The hatred and fears have long since 
 
 57. Id. at 16. 
 58. Id. at 15. 
 59. Id. at 18. 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 61. Garrett v. Faubus, 230 Ark. 445, 453, 323 S.W.2d 877, 881 (1959). 
 62. Lyons, supra note 14. 
 63. See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1990). 
 64. Garrick Feldman, Justice Jim Fought Tough Final Battle, LEADER (Feb. 17, 2010), 
https://www.arkansasleader.com/articles/top-story-justice-jim-fought-tough-final-battle/. 
 65. BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 114 (2004). 
 66. Order Granting Summary Judgement in favor of the Plaintiffs and Finding Act 144 
of 1997 and Amendment 83 Unconstitutional at 8, Wright v. State, 2014 WL 1908815 (No. 
60CV-13-2662). 
 67. Id. 
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vanished and she and her husband lived full lives together; so it will be 
for the same-sex couples. It is time to let that beacon of freedom shine 




Within three days of the decision, 169 same-sex couples applied for 
marriage licenses in Pulaski County, which includes Little Rock.69 Local 
media reported that the first couple married was Shelly Butler, 51, and Su-
san Barr, 48, who had been together for “nearly 30 years after first meeting 
at Southern Arkansas University.”70 “Today means the world,” Butler said. 
“It’s a long time coming.”71 
Social conservatives, including former Arkansas Gov. Mike Huckabee, 
called for Judge Piazza’s impeachment,72 and several legislators actually 
discussed the possibility.73 One state representative criticized Judge Piazza 
for contradicting the will of voters, who approved the state constitution’s 
ban on same-sex marriage in 2004.74 “This is a clear example where the will 
of the people has been trampled by one judge,” he said, “[i]t is very disap-
pointing . . . when someone like an activist judge thinks their will is greater 
than the majority of our state.”75 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas quickly put the order on hold as it 
considered the appeal.76 When two new justices joined the court in January 
2015,77 the court somehow ruled that the additions to the bench required the 
plaintiffs to bring a new appeal.78 In a public letter, Chief Justice Jim Han-
nah claimed the legal issue was “created out of whole cloth” to delay the 
 
 68. Id. at 9. 
 69. Gavin Lesnick, Same-sex Couples Marry in Pulaski County; McDaniel Seeks Stay, 
ARK.ONLINE (May 12, 2014), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2014/may/12/crowd-
gathers-pulaski-county-issues-first-same-sex/. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Mario Trujillo, Huckabee Wants Judge Impeached After Gay Marriage Ruling, HILL 
(May 12, 2014), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/205887-huckabee-wants-judge-
impeached-after-gay-marriage-ruling. 
 73. The City Wire Staff, Calls for Judge Piazza Impeachment Follow Gay Marriage 
Ruling, TALK BUS. & POL. (May 10, 2014), http://talkbusiness.net/2014/05/calls-for-judge-
piazza-impeachment-follow-gay-marriage-ruling/#.U3KUrfldXh4. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Paresh Dave, Arkansas Supreme Court Ruling Leaves Uncertainty on Gay Marriage, 
L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-arkansas-
stay-gay-marriage-licenses-20140514-story.html. 
 77. Max Brantley, The New Arkansas Supreme Court, with Female Majority, Takes the 
Bench; One Drops Potential Hint on Marriage Case, ARK. TIMES: ARK. BLOG (January 6, 
2015, 2:03 PM), https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2015/01/06/the-new-
arkansas-supreme-court-takes-the-bench-one-drops-potential-hint-on-marriage-case. 
 78. Smith v. Wright, 2015 Ark. 189, at *7, 461 S.W.3d 687, 692 (2015). 
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court’s decision.79 Justices Hannah and Paul Danielson recused them-
selves.80 Justice Danielson said that he could not ethically be “complicit in 
machinations which have the effect of depriving justice to any party before 
this court.”81 When Justice Donald Corbin retired from the bench in 2015, he 
admitted that the court had voted 6-1 in 2014 to affirm Judge Piazza’s deci-
sion and strike down the same-sex marriage ban.82 He said the legal issues 
were clear, particularly the argument that the ban violated the U.S. Constitu-
tion.83 “It was a tough political issue, but legally it was a cakewalk. Any-
body who knows anything about the law or had any training whatsoever as a 
constitutional lawyer would know that,” he said.84 Justice Corbin confirmed 
that the justices were contacted by legislators and social conservative groups 
who pressured them to overturn Judge Piazza’s decision.85 The state Judicial 
Discipline and Disability Commission investigated the delay but did not 
conclude that ethics rules were violated.86 
Hundreds of Arkansas couples had to wait to vindicate their constitu-
tional right to marry87 because the Arkansas Supreme Court was worried 
about the politics surrounding marriage equality. The state supreme court 
dismissed the case as moot after the U.S. Supreme Court brought marriage 
equality to the entire nation in 2015.88 
Since then, the Arkansas Supreme Court has stopped hesitating in cases 
involving LGBT rights; the court has instead ruled against the rights of 
same-sex couples in two decisions.89 In December 2016, the court ruled that 
the state could continue treating same-sex couples differently, when it 
comes to the birth certificates of their children.90 
 
 79. Id. at *8, 461 S.W.3d at 693. 
 80. Id., 461 S.W.3d at 693. 
 81. Andrew Demillo, Danielson not Seeking Reelection on Arkansas Supreme Court, 
WASH. TIMES (May 26, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/26/
danielson-not-seeking-re-election-on-arkansas-supr/. 
 82. Interview by Ernest Dumas with Justice Donald L. Corbin, Arkansas Supreme 
Court, in Hot Springs, Arkansas (July 27, 2015). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Max Brantley, Judicial Discipline Panel Clears Supreme Court of Misconduct Com-
plaint in Marriage Case, ARK. TIMES: ARK. BLOG (Sept. 16, 2015 4:15 PM), 
https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2015/09/16/judicial-discipline-panel-
clears-supreme-court-of-misconduct-complaint-in-marriage-case. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Smith v. Wright, 2015 Ark. 298 (2015). 
 89. Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, 505 S.W.3d 169 (2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 2075 
(2017); Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville, 2017 Ark. 49, 510 S.W.3d 258 (2017). 
 90. Smith, 2016 Ark. at *19, 505 S.W.3d at 182. 
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Marisa and Terrah Pavan were married in New Hampshire in 2011, and 
they had a child in Arkansas in May 2015, just months before Obergefell.91 
The Arkansas Department of Health refused to put Marisa’s name on the 
child’s birth certificate, along with Terrah, who gave birth.92 If Marisa had 
been a man, state law would have required that he be listed on the birth cer-
tificate.93 
The Pavans and two other lesbian couples sued the state.94 Judge Timo-
thy Fox ruled in their favor and ordered the state to treat same-sex couples 
the same as opposite-sex couples with respect to birth certificates.95 The 
Arkansas Supreme Court overruled that decision and rejected the argument 
that Obergefell required the state to stop limiting its presumption of parent-
age to men who are married to women who give birth.96 In an opinion by 
Justice Josephine Hart, the court also found that the disparate treatment of 
lesbian couples was justified by the state’s need for accurate records of bio-
logical parents for public health purposes, even though husbands are auto-
matically listed on birth certificates regardless of biological parentage.97 
Two of the justices also admonished Judge Fox for suggesting, in their 
words, “that if this court granted the stay, then it would deprive persons of 
their constitutional rights, and that this court previously had deprived people 
of their constitutional rights in a separate matter.”98 
In Obergefell, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution pro-
tects the right of same-sex couples to marry “on the same terms as accorded 
to couples of the opposite sex.”99 The Court ruled that bans on same-sex 
marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process 
Clause.100 Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion emphasized the harm to 
same-sex couples and their children when states treat them differently: 
This harm results in more than just material burdens. Same-sex couples 
are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would deem 
intolerable in their own lives. As the State itself makes marriage all the 
more precious by the significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that 
status has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in im-
portant respects. It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them 
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out of a central institution of the Nation’s society. Same-sex couples, 
too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek ful-
fillment in its highest meaning. 
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have 
seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of 
the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.
101
 
Justice Kennedy’s language clearly appears broad enough to cover is-
sues like birth certificates. The Court even included a list of the benefits 
associated with marriage, a list that included birth certificates.102 The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court disregards this language by noting that Obergefell men-
tions birth certificates “only once.”103 The plaintiff, Jim Obergefell, was 
seeking to have his name listed on his husband’s death certificate, and a 
plaintiff couple from Tennessee was seeking to have their parental rights 
reflect their marriage.104 As in the school desegregation cases, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court twisted the language of the U.S. Supreme Court to limit the 
reach of a historic civil rights ruling.105 
Justice Danielson’s dissent emphasized Kennedy’s concern about stig-
matizing the children of same-sex couples and the stability of such fami-
lies.106 He argued that birth certificates were clearly included in Obergefell’s 
language about the benefits associated with marriage.107 Chief Justice How-
ard Brill’s dissent included the comment, “Regardless of personal values 
and regardless of a belief that the United States Supreme Court may have 
wrongfully decided a legal issue, all are bound by the law of the land.”108 
Justice Rhonda Wood agreed that states cannot constitutionally deny same-
sex couples the benefits to marital status, which include equal access to birth 
certificates.109 
Justice Wood did, however, argue that the court should vacate Judge 
Fox’s order and give the state more time to comply, due to “the fluid nature 
of everyone’s reaction to the same-sex marriage decision and the State’s 
understandably evolving response to it.”110 Justice Wood implored the state 
legislature to amend state law to comply with Obergefell.111 Her dissent said 
that “states must comprehensively review their laws so that married same-
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sex couples and opposite-sex couples receive the same benefits of marriage, 
in light of . . . Obergefell v. Hodges.”112 Justice Kennedy’s opinion, howev-
er, made clear that “individuals need not await legislative action before as-
serting a fundamental right.”113 He said this is true, “even if the broader pub-
lic disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to act.”114 
In February 2017, the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down a Fayette-
ville civil rights law that prohibited discrimination against LGBT people in 
housing, employment, or public accommodations.115 The court cited a state 
law barring local civil rights ordinances,116 one of only three in the U.S., 
including North Carolina’s notorious H.B. 2.117 
Just a few years ago, in 2011, the court unanimously struck down a 
state ban on adoption by same-sex couples.118 The court said that the ban 
violated a state constitutional right to privacy: “the entire privilege afforded 
by law to have children in the home, whether adopted or foster children, is 
denied to cohabiting sexual partners. In both situations, the penalty imposed 
is a considerable burden on the right to intimacy in the home free from inva-
sive government scrutiny.”119 
Why has the court taken a turn against LGBT rights? In the same time 
frame, elections for the Arkansas Supreme Court have become more con-
tested and much more expensive.120 The court now includes more justices 
who were supported by conservative groups like the Law Enforcement Alli-
ance of America, a nonprofit linked to the National Rifle Association that 
does not disclose its donors.121 The 2014 election saw the first attack ads in 
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an Arkansas Supreme Court race,122 and as Justice Corbin’s comments made 
clear, the justices are well aware of the political risks involved in ruling for 
LGBT rights in this political climate.123 
A report from Lambda Legal examined 127 state supreme court rulings 
in LGBT rights cases from 2003 to 2015.124 The report found that elected 
state supreme courts were less likely to protect LGBT rights.125 Lambda 
Legal said its results suggest that this “can be attributed to ideological fac-
tors playing a larger role in shaping judges’ decisions in these courts.”126 
Lambda Legal concluded: 
Each day, thousands of elected judges in state courts across the country 
make decisions that could cost them their jobs if the law requires a ruling 
that is unpopular enough to anger a majority of voters or inspire special 
interest attacks. This threat is particularly acute when counter-
majoritarian constitutional rights are at stake, including those of LGBT 
people. If judges can’t safeguard the rights of vulnerable minorities 
without fear of retaliation, that dynamic renders our constitutional right 
to due process extremely vulnerable.
127
 
Arkansas’s high court is not alone. Other supreme court justices in con-
servative states have either defied or tested the limits of marriage equality 
rulings. Justices in Louisiana and Mississippi dissented when their col-
leagues voted to apply Obergefell to their state’s marriage laws.128 Chief 
Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court was removed from of-
fice—for a second time—for defying federal court orders.129 This time 
around, Chief Justice Moore was removed for ordering Alabama judges to 
defy a federal court ruling that struck down the state’s ban on same-sex mar-
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2012.131 In Iowa, the elected supreme court unanimously struck down the 
state’s same-sex marriage ban in 2009,132 and three justices paid a political 
price—being thrown off the court in the 2010 election.133 
In Arkansas and some other states with elected judges, it is up to feder-
al judges to fully realize the promise of marriage equality. Some jurisdic-
tions are still treating married LGBT couples differently two years after 
Obergefell. 
III. POLITICIZED AND EXPENSIVE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
A. Arkansas Supreme Court Protects Right to Jury Trial 
Teresa Broussard sued her healthcare providers for severe complica-
tions following surgery to have her thyroid glands removed in 2006.134 She 
experienced swelling, pain, and what she thought was a burn on her neck 
and chest: “Broussard described the tissue at the incision as tough and leath-
ery, and she said that black and purplish lines soon appeared that increased 
over time.”135 Broussard was released from the hospital but returned a week 
later, after the burn spread and the resulting pain grew more intense.136 She 
said that “dead and sloughing tissue developed at her neck and chest,” and 
she had to have skin removed and replaced with grafts.137 
Broussard’s lawsuit was dismissed under an Arkansas “tort reform” 
law that required patients who file medical malpractice lawsuits to provide 
expert testimony from “a medical care provider of the same specialty as the 
defendant.”138 The Arkansas Supreme Court struck down the law in 2012, 
holding that the statute was “procedural law” and not “substantive law” that 
defines legal rights or obligations.139 The court said that “procedural law 
prescribes ‘the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced,’”140 and 
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such rules “lie solely within the province of this court.”141 The court also 
noted that the law established the qualifications that an expert witness must 
possess, which is a decision for trial courts.142 The amendment violated the 
state constitution’s separation-of-powers provisions, as well as “the inherent 
authority of the courts to protect . . . the rights of the litigants.” 143 
The court struck down another “tort reform” provision in a 2011 law-
suit by 12 farmers who sued the manufacturer of an experimental strain of 
genetically modified rice.144 After the rice invaded other crops, several coun-
tries banned American rice, and the European Union imposed strict testing 
requirements.145 Rice exports dropped dramatically, and the farmers sued for 
lost revenue and punitive damages.146 The defendant corporation made more 
than $1 billion in profits that year, and the trial court imposed $42 million in 
punitive damages.147 A state law, however, limited punitive damages to 
around $1 million, unless the defendant intentionally harmed the plaintiff.148 
The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damages limit violated 
a provision of the state constitution that says, “no law shall be enacted limit-
ing the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death or for injuries 
to persons or property” except for workers compensation laws.149 
The right to a jury trial is a foundational principle of American democ-
racy.150 The U.S. Constitution and most state constitutions include a right to 
a jury trial in civil cases in which the damages exceed a certain threshold.151 
The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution says the right to a jury 
trial “shall be preserved” in cases involving damages greater than twenty 
dollars.152 The constitutions of Arkansas and most other states use stronger 
language in stating that “the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”153 
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution recognized the importance of this 
right. The Revolutionary-era colonists, facing prosecutions for violating 
British laws in which they had no say, turned to jury nullification as a means 
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of protest.154 John Adams said that representative government and trial by 
jury are the heart and lungs of liberty and that without them we have “no 
other fortification against being ridden like horses, fleeced like sheep, 
worked like cattle and fed and clothed like swine and hounds.”155 
More recently, the protections afforded by the Seventh Amendment 
have been limited by rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court, which has ruled 
that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law.156 The Court has also 
broadly interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act to reject many state-law de-
fenses by consumers or patients who object to having their cases sent to 
arbitration, where consumer advocates argue the deck is stacked in favor of 
corporate defendants.157 State constitutional rights to jury trial have also 
been limited by state supreme courts whose members were elected with 
campaign support or contributions from big business.158 
Since these rulings against tort reform, the nursing home industry has 
spent millions of dollars to shape Arkansas’s appellate courts.159 Nursing 
home CEO Michael Morton helped bankroll the 2014 campaign of Judge 
Mike Maggio for a seat on the Arkansas Court of Appeals, until the candi-
date withdrew following a series of scandals.160 Judge Maggio was later 
convicted of bribery for accepting tens of thousands of dollars in campaign 
cash from Morton in exchange for reducing a verdict in favor of a family 
who sued after a relative died at one of Morton’s nursing homes.161 
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Justice Rhonda Wood received campaign contributions from Morton 
and other healthcare interests in her 2014 campaign,162 but she refused to 
recuse herself under the court’s ethics rules in a lawsuit against Morton.163 
Justice Wood acknowledged that Morton donated $40,000 to her cam-
paign—more than one-quarter of the total received—but the campaign re-
turned half of this money.164 In three elections for the court of appeals and 
state supreme court, Justice Wood has raised around $280,000, including 
more than $90,000 from the healthcare industry, according to the National 
Institute on Money in State Politics.165 Much of this campaign cash ultimate-
ly came from companies owned by Morton.166 
Morton also contributed to an effort to amend the Arkansas Constitu-
tion to limit liability for nursing homes and other healthcare providers for 
medical malpractice,167 though the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down the 
referendum.168 The court found the referendum’s description of the amend-
ment was inadequate because it did not define “noneconomic damages” and 
did not allow it to be put before voters.169 Justice Wood argued that the court 
did not provide enough guidance on how to draft an amendment that would 
pass muster.170 
The Arkansas legislature passed a proposed constitutional amendment 
that would limit punitive and noneconomic damages in civil cases.171 The 
amendment would also take away the Arkansas Supreme Court’s authority 
over court rules and give it to the legislature, raising questions about the 
separation of powers.172 This provision of the amendment would negate the 
ruling, discussed above, to strike down a tort reform law as infringing the 
Arkansas Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority. The state bar proposed a 
competing amendment to maintain the court’s rulemaking authority, require 
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disclosure of donors to dark money groups that spend money in judicial rac-
es, and prohibit the “earmarking” of appropriations by legislators.173 
As the ultimate interpreters of state constitutions, state supreme courts 
define the right to trial by jury. All around the country, big business groups 
are spending millions of dollars to elect judges who will limit the state con-
stitutional right to a jury trial.174 And in many places, trial lawyers are 
spending big to elect judges who will interpret it broadly.175 The scope of 
constitutional rights should not depend on the outcome of elections—
legislative or judicial. 
B. “Tough on Crime” Ads Create Pressure in Criminal Cases 
Criminal defense attorney Tim Cullen ran for a seat on the Arkansas 
Supreme Court in 2014, and he faced a vicious attack ad from a dark money 
group based in Washington, D.C.176 The ad featured an eerie black-and-
white image of an empty playground, and it claimed that Cullen had called 
child pornography a “victimless crime.”177 Other states have seen similar 
attack ads, and they often tie a judge or candidate to child sexual abuse.178 
Recent studies suggest that as trial lawyers and big business fight political 
battles over state supreme courts, criminal defendants can get caught in the 
crossfire.179 
A 2013 study from the Center for American Progress (CAP) examined 
rulings in criminal cases by seven supreme courts that had recently experi-
enced their first election in which more than $3 million was spent.180 The 
study examined rulings in criminal cases within five years before and after 
each court’s first $3 million election.181 In three of these states, the courts’ 
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percentage of rulings against criminal defendants peaked during the big-
money election years, even though these elections resulted in no change in 
the membership of the courts.182 
The CAP study found that the Illinois Supreme Court’s percentage of 
rulings against defendants jumped 18 percent in 2004, as millions of dollars’ 
worth of ads flooded the state.183 One television ad featured actors portray-
ing criminals describing their grisly crimes, chuckling about them, and stat-
ing that one of the supreme court candidates had set them free.184 The per-
centage of rulings against defendants dropped in 2005.185 The court saw a 
similar peak during the 2000 election.186 In 2006, the high courts in Wash-
ington and Georgia saw their first multimillion-dollar elections, and the 
study found a similar, though smaller, peak in rulings against defendants.187 
Some of the other courts in the study experienced a change in membership, 
and the peaks came after more conservative justices joined the courts.188 
Studies from Professor Joanna Shepherd and others have found similar 
trends in states with big-money supreme court elections.189 A 2014 study by 
Shepherd and Kang examined rulings in criminal cases from 32 states from 
2008 to 2013.190 The study found a correlation between the number of ads in 
judicial elections and rulings against criminal defendants.191 It also found 
that, 
Justices in states whose bans on corporate and union spending on elec-
tions were struck down by Citizens United were less likely to vote in fa-
vor of criminal defendants than they were before the decision . . . . In 
these states, the removal of those prohibitions after Citizens United is as-
sociated with, on average, a 7 percent decrease in justices’ voting in fa-
vor of criminal defendants.
192
 
There is no evidence that such trends are occurring in Arkansas, but 
that could change as attack ads become more common. The court has recent-
ly found itself at the center of a controversy surrounding the death penalty. 
In April 2017, the state planned to carry out eight executions over two 
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weeks, before its lethal injection drugs expired, but the Arkansas Supreme 
Court halted two of the executions.193 When the court’s order came down, a 
federal court and Pulaski County Judge Wendell Griffen had effectively 
halted the other executions.194 Judge Griffen had ruled in favor of a pharma-
ceutical manufacturer which claimed that the state had obtained the drugs 
for the lethal injections by improper means, and he ordered the state to re-
turn the drugs.195 
Judge Griffen was admonished and removed from all death penalty 
cases by the state supreme court for participating in a death penalty protest 
on the same day that he entered the order.196 Some perceived the judge as 
playing the part of an inmate in a mock execution.197 Judge Griffen argued 
that the state supreme court made its decision without giving him an oppor-
tunity to defend his conduct.198 The judge, who is also a pastor, described 
the event as “a Good Friday prayer vigil with other members of my church 
congregation.”199 As with Judge Piazza, some legislators tried to build sup-
port for impeaching Judge Griffen.200 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The current method of choosing Arkansas Supreme Court justices does 
not allow the judicial branch to protect individual rights in the face of politi-
cal pressure to do otherwise. This system is not fair to Arkansas’ LGBT 
citizens, nor to the criminal defendants who could become fodder for “soft 
on crime” campaign ads. Like some other elected officials in the state, Ar-
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kansas Supreme Court justices stood in the way of efforts to desegregate 
schools and ensure equality for LGBT couples. 
Because the U.S. Constitution is the “Supreme Law of the Land,” fed-
eral court rulings in favor of civil rights have ultimately been enforced, even 
when state officials resist.201 Justice Johnson and the state supreme court 
refused to intervene when state officials tried to delay or thwart the imple-
mentation of Brown v. Board of Education, forcing the U.S. Supreme Court 
to put an end to the state’s recalcitrance. Arkansas officials have begun of-
fering birth certificates on equal terms to all married parents, though the 
state and courts are still deciding how to deal with the language of the dis-
criminatory birth certificate statute.202 In Pavan, the High Court again made 
it clear that its marriage equality ruling “can neither be nullified openly and 
directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers nor nulli-
fied indirectly by them . . . .”203 
In between these legal battles over civil rights, there were certainly 
counterexamples of the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreting state constitu-
tional rights broadly. The court has protected the right to a jury trial, as dis-
cussed above. Though it fought to preserve segregation 50 years ago, the 
court has acted to bring about a more equal state education system since 
then. A lawsuit by the Lake View School District against the state resulted 
in a decades-long legal battle over the adequacy of Arkansas’s education 
financing system.204 Despite the state’s attempts to fix education funding in 
the 1990s, the school district argued the state was failing to satisfy its consti-
tutional mandate to “maintain a general, suitable and efficient system of free 
public schools and . . . adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the 
advantages and opportunities of education.”205 The Arkansas Supreme Court 
agreed in rulings in 2002 and 2004,206 and the legislature is still working 
towards satisfying its constitutional mandate to provide an adequate educa-
tion to all of Arkansas’s children.207 
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Despite fairly recent rulings that could be described as progressive, 
special interests that want more conservative, pro-business justices are be-
ginning to dominate spending in Arkansas Supreme Court races.208 These 
special interests want a court that will uphold tort reform laws, even if they 
eviscerate the right to jury trial. To get this court, they have resorted to at-
tack ads that pressure judges to rule against criminal defendants. Elections 
for the Arkansas Supreme Court have certainly become more expensive and 
rancorous in recent years.209 The increased politicization may have contrib-
uted to the recent anti-LGBT rights rulings, and one non-ruling.210 More 
spending means more attack ads, and presumably, a stronger desire to avoid 
controversial rulings. 
An Arkansas Bar task force recommended a system in which a com-
mission composes a list of three candidates from which the governor choos-
es a nominee, subject to Senate confirmation.211 The state bar’s proposal 
includes a single, 14-year term, similar to a proposal from the Wisconsin 
bar.212 An American Bar Association commission in 2003 adopted the posi-
tion that judges, elected or appointed, should serve a single term of at least 
15 years.213 Arkansas already has term limits for its state legislators, and 
voters in 2014 lengthened that limit to 16 years.214 
Such a system would ensure that justices, once on the bench, never 
have to worry about being reelected or reappointed. This would give them 
the independence needed to protect individual rights in the face of political 
pressure. Former California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus said that fac-
ing reelection is like having a “crocodile in your bathtub” that you can try to 
ignore.215 “You cannot forget the fact that you have a crocodile in your bath-
tub . . . . You keep wondering whether you’re letting yourself be influenced, 
and you do not know. You do not know yourself that well,” he said.216 As an 
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example, Justice Kaus cited his ruling to uphold a controversial ballot initia-
tive just weeks before his 1982 reelection.217 Alicia Bannon of the Brennan 
Center for Justice recently noted: 
Importantly, some of the strongest empirical evidence on how selection 
impacts judicial independence suggests that reselection pressures — 
whether through elections or appointments — pose severe challenges to 
fair courts. Yet, this is an area where the safeguards are almost uniformly 
weak. Only three states— Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode 




Alexander Hamilton referred to life tenure for federal judges as an “ex-
cellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative 
body.”219 His Federalist No. 78 argues that judicial independence is needed 
to guard constitutional rights from “the effects of those ill humors, which the 
arts of designing men . . . sometimes disseminate among the people them-
selves, and which . . . have a tendency . . . to occasion dangerous innova-
tions in the government, and serious oppressions of the minority party in the 
community.”220 He makes clear that life tenure allows judges to serve as a 
counter-majoritarian check but notes that “it would require an uncommon 
portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the 
Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the 
major voice of the community.”221 
The framers of the U.S. Constitution understood the need for judicial 
independence. In Arkansas, the system of electing judges has not afforded 
judges the independence needed to protect individual rights. The Arkansas 
bar’s proposal would grant judges much more freedom to rule as the law 
requires, regardless of the political consequences. Our constitutional values 
of justice and equality should never be put to a vote. 
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